* fix: validate redirects in favicon fetching to prevent SSRF
The previous SSRF fix (GHSA-jcc6-f9v6-f7jw) only validated redirects for
the main page URL but not for the favicon fetch path. An attacker could
craft an HTML page with a favicon link that redirects to a private IP,
bypassing the IP validation and leaking internal network data as base64.
Extract a reusable `safe_get()` function that validates every redirect hop
against private/internal IPs and use it for both page and favicon fetches.
Resolves: GHSA-9fr2-pprw-pp9j
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address PR review feedback for SSRF favicon fix
- Fix off-by-one in redirect limit: only raise RuntimeError when the
response is still a redirect after MAX_REDIRECTS hops, not when the
final response is a successful 200
- Return final URL from safe_get() so favicon href resolution uses the
correct origin after redirects instead of the original URL
- Add unit tests for validate_url_ip and safe_get covering private IP
blocking, redirect-following, and redirect limit enforcement
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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